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TRUMPING PRECEDENT WITH 
ORIGINAL MEANING: NOT AS RADICAL 
AS IT SOUNDS 
Randy E. Barnett* 
Originalism was thought to be buried in the 1980s with cri-
tiques such as those by Paul Brest' and Jeff Powell.2 Brest 
charged that originalism was unworkable, while Powell main-
tained that originalism was inconsistent with the original inten-
tions of the Founders.3 Others raised the moral challenge of why 
we should be ruled by the "dead hand" of the past. Yet an 
originalist approach to interpretation has -like a phoenix from 
the ashes or Dracula from his grave, depending on your point of 
view-survived into the Twenty-first Century as an intellectual 
contender. Indeed, it has thrived like no other approach to in-
• 4 terpretatiOn. 
This remarkable survival is due, in part, to originalism itself 
having morphed in response to these critiques from its previous 
preoccupation with the original intentions of the framers to an 
emphasis on the original public meaning of the text at the time 
of its enactment.5 Determining the public meaning of the words 
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory, Georgetown University Law 
Center. Permission to photocopy for classroom use is granted. 
1. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. 
REv. 204 (1980). 
2. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985). 
3. The analysis of the next three paragraphs is greatly elaborated in RANDY E. 
BARNETI, REsTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 89-117 (2004). 
4. I originally told this story in Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginal-
ists, 45 LOY. L. REv. 611,611-29 (1999). The tale has been updated and greatly expanded 
in Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's 
Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1134-48 (2003) (discussing the contributions 
to this development played by Robert Bork, Steven Calabresi, Frank Easterbrook, Gary 
Lawson, John Manning, Michael McConnell, Michael Paulsen, Saikrishna Prakash, An-
tonin Scalia, Guy Seidman, and others). Given the brevity of this essay, I will not even 
attempt to give credit where credit is due. Kesavan and Paulsen do a wonderful job of 
this. 
5. See Keith Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 599 
(2004) (distinguishing the "old originalism" based on original intent and judicial fstraint 
257 ) 
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of the Constitution is much more practical than discovering the 
myriad subjective intentions of those who wrote or ratified it. 
That there is a unique original public meaning is a far more plau-
sible claim than that one can discern a unique original intention 
from the potentially conflicting intentions of various framers. 
And it turns out that the Founders themselves practiced a form 
of original meaning originalism.6 
Finally, an original public meaning approach can be 
grounded in the need to impose written constraints on all 
branches of government. According to this normative defense, 
we should adhere to the original meaning of the document, not 
because long dead men have any authority over we the living. 
We should do so because we, right here and right now, ought to 
consider a written constitution among the structural features of 
our Constitution, and this feature would be undermined if any of 
the branches of government, either alone or together, could alter 
and weaken the written limitations which have been imposed 
upon them. 
I. THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF ORIGINALISM AND 
PRECEDENT 
With these familiar criticisms largely neutralized, what intel-
lectual challenge to originalism is left? Today, the biggest single 
challenge facing originalists is reconciling originalism with 
precedent.7 The problem can be summarized by the following 
syllogism: 
(1) Originalism amounts to the claim that the meaning of 
the Constitution should remain the same until it is 
properly changed. 
(2) None of the three branches of government on whom 
the written Constitution imposes limits should be able 
to alter these limitations, either alone or in combina-
from the "new originalism" based on public meaning and the need for judges to adhere 
to it). 
6. Although Caleb Nelson questions the degree to which the move to original 
meaning obviates the various difficulties associated with original intent, he does not deny 
it mitigates the seriousness of criticisms of originalism that were previously thought to be 
fatal. See Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. On. L. REv. 
519, 553-60 (2003). 
7. Another important theoretical issue confronting originalism is the role of the 
Founders' interpretive conventions in determining the original meaning of the text. This 
issue has been insightfully examined by Caleb Nelson in id. I shall not discuss it here. 
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tion, without properly amending the Constitution in 
writing. 
(3) For this reason, the Supreme Court cannot change the 
Constitution which it is sworn to uphold and enforce. 
(4) Were the Court mistakenly to decide a case that 
adopts an interpretation that contradicts the original 
meaning of the text, and this mistake was entrenched 
by the doctrine of precedent, then the Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the text would trump its 
original meaning. 
(5) In this manner, the doctrine of precedent is inconsis-
tent with originalism. 
Two possible responses to this syllogism are obvious. The 
first is to treat the syllogism as a reductio ad absurdum and to re-
ject originalism. The second is to embrace the conclusion of the 
syllogism as correct and to reject precedent. There are difficul-
ties with each of these options. 
The problem with rejecting originalism goes to the norma-
tive arguments on its behalf. Accepting that judicial precedent 
can trump original meaning puts judges above the Constitution 
they are supposed to be following, not making. If precedent 
trumps original meaning, then the Constitution would truly be 
what the Supreme Court says it is, rather than the Supreme 
Court itself being bound to adhere to the Constitution. In sum, if 
the normative case for originalism is compelling, then it provides 
a normative argument for rejecting the doctrine of precedent, 
where precedent conflicts with original meaning. 
The problems with rejecting the doctrine of precedent are 
several. One difficulty that troubles many an originalist about re-
jecting precedent is that stare decisis seems important to the rule 
of law requirement that like cases be treated alike. Most 
originalists place a high value on the rule of law, which is one 
reason they care so much about preserving the original meaning 
of a written constitution. Were precedent to be rejected, the sta-
bility of constitutional law might be undermined as each Court 
considers itself completely free to reach different conclusions 
about the meaning of the text as time goes by. 
But critics of originalism, and indeed even some originalists, 
would be even more troubled by another consequence of reject-
ing the doctrine of precedent. Such a rejection would seemingly 
lead to the rejection of many of the landmark cases most treas-
ured by constitutional law professors, and even by the general 
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public. While many examples may come to mind, it is the possi-
bility of rejecting Brown v. Board of Education8 that is most 
troubling and illustrates the difficulty. 
Let me hasten to add that I do not think original meaning 
interpretation is inconsistent with Brown. On this subject, I am 
influenced by the impressive scholarship of Michael McConnell, 
though I have not myself independently assessed the evidence or 
the criticisms that have been offered of his thesis. 9 Akhil Arnar 
has also provided a powerful account reconciling Brown with the 
original meaning of the Fourteenth Arnendment.10 Whereas 
McConnell's work can be viewed as focusing more on original 
intent than on original meaning, Arnar's analysis seems a 
straightforward analysis of the public meaning of the text, both 
then and now. Of course, if the original intentions of the framers 
of the Fourteenth Amendment were consistent with Brown then 
a fortiori so too would likely be the original public meaning of 
the words they chose to enact. Neither writer expressly discusses 
this distinction, however, as was not uncommon when original-
ism was in transition. Consequently, a considerable amount of 
originalist scholarship straddles the line. 
In addition, as discussed briefly below, I do not view "sepa-
rate but equal" as the original meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Instead, I consider this doctrine to be a judicial 
construction of the text that may or may not be consistent with 
its original meaning. Even if it is consistent, it can nevertheless 
be rejected in favor of another construction that is also consis-
tent with the original meaning, but which enhances the legiti-
macy of the Constitution. 
Be all this as it may, my point is only that, if one had to 
choose between original meaning and Brown, most would 
choose Brown. Having raised the issue of Brown, however, it is 
only fair to note how this case reveals that nonoriginalists have 
their own problems with the doctrine of precedent. For even if 
Brown could not be justified on originalist grounds, it was a 
marked departure from the precedent of Plessy v. Ferguson.11 It 
is at least awkward for nonoriginalists to consider the rejection 
8. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
9. See Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 U. 
VA. L. REV. 947 (1995); Michael W. McConnell, The Originalist Justification for Brown: 
A Reply to Professor Klarman, 81 U. VA. L. REV. 1937 (1995). 
10. See Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. 
L. REV. 26,55-78 (2000). 
11. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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of precedent a reductio ad absurdum of originalism when they 
themselves would favor rejecting the precedent of Plessy in favor 
of Brown come hell or high water. 
In short, for nonoriginalists (and most everyone else), first 
comes Brown and only then comes precedent. While different 
versions of nonoriginalism may be deemed superior if they can 
better handle Brown than can originalism, it is far from clear 
that these nonoriginalist theories can better handle the doctrine 
of precedent. Consider the cases of United States v. Lopez12 and 
United States v. Morrison. 13 These are cases that many law pro-
fessors would like to see reversed, and it seems that the four dis-
senting Justices in those cases are still reluctant to consider 
themselves bound by them. That they are precedent does not 
seem to mean very much to nonoriginalist professors or Justices. 
So why should precedent-say of Wickard v. Filburn 14 to take a 
case at random-bother originalists overly much if it conflicts 
with the original meaning of the Commerce Clause?15 
Indeed, many nonoriginalists who now invoke precedent to 
browbeat originalism themselves appear committed only to the 
precedents they happen to like, and this is hardly a commitment 
to the doctrine of precedent at all. In other words, perhaps no 
one really adheres to anything like a robust doctrine of prece-
dent, so originalists who rejected the doctrine would hardly be 
unique in this regard. Perhaps originalists are just more candid 
than their nonoriginalist critics. With the doctrine of precedent 
rejected to some degree by nearly everyone, the debate would 
return to the normative and practical merits of originalism on 
which grounds, I contend, the theory is strong. 
Indeed, this discussion highlights the well-known problem 
with the doctrine of precedent. No one thinks that precedents 
should last forever. Everyone thinks that some precedent should 
be rejected. So all theorists, whether originalists or not, place 
other values above the rule of law concerns that lead them to fa-
vor precedent only some of the time. How and when precedent 
should be rejected remains one of the great unresolved contro-
versies of jurisprudence. It is no wonder that originalists have yet 
to solve the problem that has so eluded so many for so long. 
12. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
13. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
14. 317 us 111 (1942). 
15. See Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 101 (2001); Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the 
Commerce Clause, 55 ARK. L. REv. 847 (2003). 
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Still, originalism does seem to have a special difficulty with 
precedent. Nonoriginalists can accept the idea that precedent 
can sometimes bind to some degree, though there is no consensus 
on how much and when. Originalists seem committed to reject-
ing precedent altogether. Perhaps originalism can claim the ad-
vantage of avoiding the knotty issue of how and when precedent 
is to be followed, but it does so at the seeming expense of either 
the rule of law values that support some doctrine of precedent or 
sanctified precedent such as Brown that all nonoriginalists, and 
the overwhelming majority of originalists, would like to see up-
held. 
Perhaps the problem for originalists with precedent boils 
down to what, for nonoriginalists, is its biggest weakness. If 
times and moral understanding really have changed so much that 
the original constitution as amended is simply unacceptable as 
compared with the constitutional law provided by the rulings of 
the Supreme Court, this deficiency is revealed by originalism's 
rejection of morally superior precedent. Notice, however, that 
when stripped of its ruffles and flourishes this objection to 
originalism represents the rejection of the written Constitution 
as enacted-a rejection that Courts and scholars alike are every 
bit as reluctant to make openly as originalists are reluctant to 
openly reject certain hallowed precedents. 
II. THE PROPER ROLE OF PRECEDENT WITHIN 
ORIGINALISM 
I think that accepting originalism means accepting the syllo-
gism provided above.16 A commitment to originalism is a claim 
about how the Constitution ought to be interpreted. The norma-
tive case for originalism is based, in large measure, on the supe-
riority of the enacted text over the opinions of the branches of 
government that it is supposed to govern and limit-including 
16. Perhaps the first modem originalist to forthrightly reach the conclusion that 
originalism entails the rejection of the doctrine of precedent was my colleague Gary 
Lawson. See Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL'Y 23 (1994). For an originalist who agrees, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The 
IntrinsiCIJlly Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 289 (2005). In-
deed, Paulsen thinks the rejection of stare decisis can be accomplished by simple act of 
Congress. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress 
Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535 (2000). Lawson 
disagrees. See Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of Judicial 
Decision-Making, 18 CoNST. COMMENT. 191 (2001). For Paulsen's response, see Michael 
Stokes Paulsen, Lawson's Awesome (Also Wrong, Some), 18 CONST. CoMMENT. 231 
(2001). 
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the Supreme Court. An originalist simply could not accept that 
the Supreme Court could change the meaning of the text from 
what it meant as enacted and still remain an originalist. Yet with 
some exceptions,17 until very recently most originalists have not 
confronted the issue of precedent directly and certainly not 
theoretically. In the balance of this essay, I explain why the 
originalist rejection of precedent is not so radical as it at first ap-
pears. 
A. N ONCONSTITUTIONAL CASES 
First of all, the doctrine of precedent could survive for any 
or all cases whose outcome does not concern the original mean-
ing of the text. As Justice Scalia has observed, "a very small pro-
portion of judges' work is constitutional interpretation .... 
(Even in the Supreme Court, I would estimate that well less than 
a fifth of the issues we confront are constitutional issues- and 
probablX less than a twentieth if you exclude criminal-law 
cases.)" 8 Obviously, in the numerous cases that simply do not 
turn on constitutional analysis, courts could be as bound by 
precedent as is deemed appropriate. But even a great many con-
stitutional cases, perhaps most, do not turn on the original public 
meaning of the text and, in such cases, courts could be bound by 
precedent as well. Understanding why is crucial to grasping that 
permitting original meaning to trump precedent is not nearly so 
radical as it sounds. 
B. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTIONS 
According to the version of originalism I have identified 
and defended, the original public meaning of the text governs 
only to the extent that this meaning can be ascertained and ap-
plied to a case or controversy. Sometimes the original meaning 
of a text is clear and rule-like-the age limits for presidents is the 
favorite example-and it directly dictates the outcome of a case 
or controversy. Other times, however, the original meaning is 
rather abstract, or at a higher level of generality. A contract law 
17. See e.g., Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, supra note 16; 
Arnar, supra note 10, at 78-89 (discussing "precedent's proper place"); and Nelson, supra 
note 6, at 588-98 (discussing "originalism and the passage of time"). 
18. ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of 
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Law, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND TiiE LAW 3, 13 (1997). 
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scholar would refer to the text as vague.19 The Due Process 
Clause is a clause like this. 
In response to the problem of vagueness, original intent 
originalists consult the intentions of the framers to narrow the 
meaning of seemingly open-ended provisions to constrain the 
discretion of judges. This stance, however, revives many of the 
persuasive objections to original intent originalism that the move 
to original public meaning originalism was meant to avoid. 
In contrast, an original meaning originalist can take the ab-
stract meaning as given, and accept that the application of this 
vague meaning to particular cases is left to future actors, includ-
ing judges, to decide. The process of applying general abstract 
provisions to the facts of particular cases by adopting intermedi-
ate doctrines is progerly called, not interpretation, but constitu-
tional construction. 
Some original public meaning originalists would have courts 
ignore the original meaning of the text when it is insufficiently 
rule-like.21 Suffice it to say that, in my view, for judges to ignore 
the original meaning of the text because it is inconsistent with 
some extrinsic notion of the Rule of Law is as improper as ignor-
ing the original meaning of the text because it conflicts with 
some extrinsic notion of Justice. The original constitutional 
structure as amended would be radically altered- and for the 
worse- if all the more abstract or vague provisions of the text 
were ignored in this way. That the Constitution includes more 
open-ended or abstract provisions, and thereby delegates discre-
tion to judges, does not justify ignoring these portions of the 
text. Textual vagueness does, however, argue for courts to adopt 
more rule-like constitutional constructions or doctrines to put 
these provisions into effect. 
Some constitutional constructions or doctrines may be much 
better than others in implementing the original meaning of the 
text, in which case precedent should not stand in the way. For 
19. See E. Allan Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 
953-56 (1967). 
20. The distinction between constitutional interpretation and construction is elabo-
rated in BARNETI, supra note 3, at 118-30. My discussion there is based on the distinc-
tion made in KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL 
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (1999). 
21. I think this attitude informs Justice Scalia's view that the Ninth Amendment is 
not justiciable because "the Constitution's refusal to 'deny or disparage' other rights is 
far removed from affirming any one of them, and even farther removed from authorizing 
judges to identify what they might be, and to enforce the judges' list ~gainst. laws .duly 
enacted by the people." Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,91 (2000) (Scaha, J., dtssentmg). 
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example, my case for adopting a Presumption of Liberty-which 
is a constitutional construction- argues against continuing to 
adhere to the precedents that established a presumption of con-
stitutionality, as modified by Footnote Four, as further modified 
by the jurisprudence of "fundamental rights"- the doctrine I call 
Footnote Four-Plus, which is itself a constitutional construc-
tion.22 In addition, when two constructions are equally consistent 
with the original meaning of the text, I have argued that courts 
should favor constructions that enhance the legitimacy of the 
Constitution. By "constitutional legitimacy" I mean that quality 
or qualities that enable a legal system to issue laws that bind in 
conscience those upon whom they are imposed. 
It is easy to imagine, however, that many choices among 
competing constructions are both equally consistent with origi-
nal meaning and not clearly preferable on grounds of legitimacy. 
What proportion of constitutional constructions fit this descrip-
tion I do not know, but I suspect it is quite common. Because the 
Constitution does not dictate the number of Supreme Court Jus-
tices, the number chosen by Congress is a construction. The 
number at the founding, six, and the present number of nine, are 
both equally consistent with the text, and neither is to be pre-
ferred on grounds of legitimacy. The number zero, however, is 
certainly inconsistent with the text, as is probably also the num-
ber one. 
Although there is much more to say about how constitu-
tional construction can be constrained by original meaning while 
not entirely determined deductively by it, for present purposes it 
is enough to say this: judicial constructions of the Constitution 
that are not inconsistent with original meaning may well be subject 
to the doctrine of precedent. So while the judicially-created doc-
trine of "content neutrality" is by no means a product of the 
original meaning of the First Amendment, it is a constitutional 
construction by which the original meaning of the First Amend-
ment can be applied to concrete cases. Once the doctrine of con-
tent neutrality is adopted, there is no originalist objection to it 
being considered a binding precedent, even if someone proposes 
a different way to implement the right of freedom of speech. 
Indeed, as was suggested above, Separate but Equal could 
be considered a constitutional construction of the Privileges or 
22 See BARNEIT, supra note 3, at 224-69 (arguing that the Presumption of Liberty 
is more consistent with the original meaning of the Ninth and Fourteenth amendments 
than the doctrine of "Footnote Four-Plus"). 
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Immunities Clause or the Equal Protection Clause. Assuming 
arguendo that the construction of Separate But Equal was con-
sistent with the original meaning of the text-though I am skep-
tical of this claim-it could become a binding precedent until it is 
rejected in favor of another construction of these clauses that is 
equally consistent with its original meaning, but superior on 
grounds of constitutional legitimacy. 
Part of the conundrum over Brown may well be the assump-
tion, by critics of originalism perhaps even more so than by 
originalists, that the original meaning of the Equal Protection 
Clause is determinate enough to dictate Plessy and reject Brown. 
Whether or not this claim is true of original intent originalism, I 
doubt it is true of original meaning originalism. Nor would it be 
surprising to find that some critics of originalism seek out its 
least plausible version so as to reject originalism as unacceptable. 
Indeed, given the present consensus about Brown, it may be that 
some critics of originalism relish the claim that the original 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment dictates the doctrine of 
Separate But Equal and the rejection of Brown so they can use 
this consequence as a cudgel against originalists. 
C. RELIANCE CLAIMS 
Another role for precedent within originalism concerns reli-
ance claims. An originalist need not reject legal claims made by 
particular persons made in reliance on mistaken precedent. It is 
possible that citizens have reasonably relied upon erroneous de-
cisions of the past in a manner that should be protected. The 
most obvious and easy example of this is the Social Security sys-
tem. Even if we assume that, for some reason, the Social Security 
Act is unconstitutional because it violates the original meaning 
of the Constitution, the government might still be obligated to 
make good on its promises to those who have relied to their det-
riment upon them. 
The problem with the reliance argument is not with its va-
lidity, but that it is usually applied much too broadly to cases 
where people have "relied" in much too inchoate a sense. It is 
especially misapplied to the reliance of governmental actors or 
interest groups on the continued existence of unconstitutional 
powers or institutions. Nevertheless, in my view, a commitment 
to original meaning over precedent does not entail a commit-
ment to rejecting properly tailored reliance claims by individual 
citizens. 
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D. EPISTEMIC CONSIDERATIONS 
In addition, Akhil Amar has plausibly suggested that, within 
originalism, precedent can play an "epistemic" role: 
Given the Court's clear constitutional design, it seems permis-
sible for the Court to give its past decisions a rebuttable pre-
sumption of correctness. A past case may properly control un-
til proven wrong, with those challenging it saddled with the 
burden of proof. Furthermore, a Justice may rightly give a 
precedent epistemic weight in deciding whether the burden is 
met. Even if her first reaction is that the precedent is wrongly 
decided as a documentarian matter, the very fact of the prior 
decision may persuade her that her first reaction is mistaken.23 
So when the claim is made that original meaning is inconsistent 
with a previous judicial decision, courts may give their prior de-
cision a benefit of the doubt. However, any epistemic "presump-
tion of correctness" should only be extended to previous deci-
sions that actually attempted to discern original meaning. 
Decisions that abjure original meaning can hardly be presumed 
to have been correctly decided on originalist grounds. 
E. ORIGINAL AMIBIGUITIES 
Finally, Caleb Nelson has proposed a role within originalism 
for early precedents that would be permanent in the sense that 
they should not be reversed by later interpreters. He contends 
that the indeterminacy of original meaning can properly be "liq-
uidated" by early decisions of the ratification conventions, Con-
gress, and the courts.24 His account of original meaning would 
accord a role for the Founders' interpretive convention that 
early precedent can "fix" the meaning of terms whose original 
meaning was indeterminate when enacted. As I understand it, 
Professor Nelson's proposal concerning "liquidation" of mean-
ing is limited to rectifying an initial indeterminacy in original 
meaning. It would not allow for early precedent to trump a con-
trary determinate original meaning of the text. Still, very early 
decisions and practices can "fix" the original meaning of the text 
where the text is open-ended and, once fixed, this meaning can-
not then be trumped by later judicial decision.25 
23. Amar, supra note 10, at 81. Amar used the term "documentarian" to refer to a 
method of interpretation akin to what I and others now describe as original public mean-
ing originalism. 
24. See Nelson, supra note 6, at 525-53. 
25. See id. at 521. 
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For example, he plausibly shows how the Ex Post 
Facto Clause was originally ambiguous about whether it applied 
to all laws or only to criminal penalties.26 By "ambiguous" I 
mean that there is equally good historical evidence in support of 
both of these meanings, such that (so far as we know from the 
evidence) either meaning would have been reasonable.27 He then 
proposes that this ambiguity in original meaning could properly 
be, and was, fixed by the early decades of congressional and ju-
dicial practice limiting the clause to criminal penalties.28 The fact 
that there is evidence that supports a broader original meaning 
of the clause-which is why the clause had more than one plau-
sible meaning-could not afterwards be used by courts to change 
the meaning fixed by early precedent. Here then is a further role 
for precedent in originalism, but a type of irreversible precedent 
that binds all future interpreters. 
If Professor Nelson is correct about this "liquidating" role 
of precedent within originalism, it then becomes important to 
distinguish terms that are ambiguous from those that are vague.29 
A provision can be vague because, though its meaning is deter-
minate, it is unclear whether that meaning includes a particular 
object. For example, while the original meaning of "arms" in the 
Second Amendment undoubtedly refers to weapons, including 
firearms and swords, does this term also extend to artillery 
pieces (which were in existence at the time of the framing) or 
surface-to-air missiles (which were not)? All terms are vague to 
a greater or lesser degree depending on the context, so this sort 
of problem is not uncommon. 
In contrast, a provision is ambiguous if it has more than one 
possible meaning. For example, did the term "arms" in the Sec-
ond Amendment refer to weapons or to the appendages to 
which our hands are attached? Most terms are not ambiguous in 
context. Although potential ambiguity can often be resolved by 
historical evidence, Professor Nelson's discussion of the Ex Post 
Facto Clause provides an exam~e of a potential ambiguity that 
appears historically irresolvable. 
26. See especially id. at 580, n.246. 
27. Cf. Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 2 Hurl. & C. 906 (Court of Exchequer 1864) (insuffi-
cient evidence to favor one ship named "Peerless" over the other). 
28. See Nelson, supra note 6, at 578-SS. 
29. In his article, Professor Nelson does not seem to draw a distinction between 
these two distinct sources of linguistic indeterminacy. 
30. In contrast, his discussion of "cruel and unusual" punishments (supra note 6 at 
544-47) might concern either ambiguity-e.g. did the term "unusual" refer to punish-
ments that were unusual at the time of the founding or punishments that are unusual at 
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Professor Nelson's proposal that initial practice can provide 
a precedent to fix original meaning that was indeterminate when 
enacted is more plausible when dealing with ambiguity than 
vagueness. When we cannot tell whether a term meant X or Y 
when it was enacted, early practice favoring X over Y might be 
an interpretive convention that clarifies original meaning in a 
manner that is compatible with the normative case for original-
ism. In contrast, when the original meaning of the term is X, and 
X is vague, the application of X to a particular object could be 
considered a matter of constitutional construction that is not 
permanently fixed by early precedent. Instead, original meaning 
can be determinate at a higher level of generality, while the ap-
plication of this meaning to particular objects is left to the discre-
tion of future decision makers. These future constitutional con-
structions can be subject to the ordinary doctrine of precedent 
that, once adopted by the Supreme Court, are followed by future 
Justices, but which can also be overturned when a later Court is 
convinced that an earlier decision was manifestly in error. 
CONCLUSION 
In this essay, I hope to have explained why there is much 
room for the doctrine of precedent in originalism. It is not in-
compatible with original public meaning originalism to adhere to 
precedent in cases involving (a) nonconstitutional issues, (b) 
matters of constitutional construction, (c) detrimental reliance 
by identifiable individuals, (d) epistemic concerns about the cor-
rectness of originalist claims, and perhaps also (e) where the text 
was originally ambiguous. After all this, some may then wonder 
what bite is left in originalism? 
The answer, while obvious, bears emphasis: Where a deter-
minate original meaning can be ascertained and is inconsistent 
with previous judicial decisions, these precedents should be re-
versed and the original meaning adopted in their place. That 
original meaning would require a change in current doctrine, 
even where contrary to precedent, is evidenced by the resistance 
towards originalism still manifested by nonoriginalists wishing to 
preserve the status quo. Apparently the shoe still squeezes. 
Knowing the degree to which a commitment to originalism 
entails the rejection of the doctrine of precedent may well influ-
the time the standard is being applied? -or vagueness-e.g. is a particular punishment 
"unusual" under the proper standard?-or both. 
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ence the degree to which originalism is deemed acceptable by 
academics, judges, and the general public. For this reason, it is 
important to make clear that a commitment to following original 
meaning where it conflicts with judicial precedent is far less radi-
cal a stance than critics of originalism, and perhaps even some 
originalists, assume. 
